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The Size of the Problem 
It is not a pretty picture. Unless U.S. fiscal policy is changed dramatically, the 
national debt will grow at an increasing rate and far outpace economic growth. 
Using a reasonable definition of current policy, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO 2010) projects that the national debt in the hands of the public will reach 185 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 2035. Of course, those buying our 
debt will likely go on strike long before we reach that point. 
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Figure 1.  
 
 The arithmetic underlying CBO’s projection is extremely simple. Two 
program areas—Social Security and health—will be responsible for about 50 
percent of total federal spending once the stimulus program of 2009 phases out. 
Spending in both areas is rising faster than GDP and faster than tax revenues. Tax 
revenues, on the other hand, have been remarkably constant historically, varying 
between 17 and 19 percent of GDP for all but 11 of the past 50 years. If programs 
other than Social Security and health and the tax burden remain roughly constant 
relative to GDP, the deficit and the national debt will grow rapidly. Eventually, the 
interest cost of the debt begins to dominate the budget and ultimately the system 
explodes. 
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Figure 2. 
 
 
 Over the next three decades, the aging of the population is the most 
important driver of Social Security and health costs, as retiring baby boomers 
apply for Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare in large numbers and then draw 
benefits for decades. But health programs face an additional problem. Health costs 
for every age group have been growing considerably faster than income. Although 
our health care system is incredibly inefficient, technological change is the most 
important source of cost growth in the long run. Medical research constantly 
develops new treatments and drugs, most of which are extremely valuable. Even 
when they are not effective, the consumer has little incentive to economize, 
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because someone else, such as Medicare or employer-provided health insurance, 
appears to be paying most of the cost. 
 Generally, when we think about the aging of the population, we focus on the 
fact that there are more old people and they are living longer. But aging has 
another important dimension. The average age of the population is rising, not only 
because there are more old people, but because there are relatively fewer young 
people. Baby boomers and generation X-ers did not have enough children to 
support them well in their old age. Consequently, the growth of the labor force is 
slowing, and that implies that the growth of tax revenues is also slowing. That 
contributes significantly to our long-run budget problem. 
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Figure 3.  
  
 The existence of a long-run budget problem has been apparent for decades, 
ever since it became clear that the abrupt fall in birth rates that followed the baby 
boom was a long-lasting phenomenon. However, the problem did not seem that 
urgent until it worsened significantly as result of the Great Recession of 2008–09. 
The economic downturn caused revenues to plummet while spending on safety net 
programs soared. A massive stimulus program was enacted that further cut tax 
revenues and added to spending. A recent estimate put its cost at $814 billion. The 
national debt grew from 40 percent of GDP at the end of fiscal 2008 to 62 percent 
by the end of 2010. 
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 Even with a slow economic recovery, the deficit is expected to decline 
between 2010 and 2014 given the budget policies that President Obama 
recommended in his 2011 budget. However, the debt will continue to rise relative 
to GDP, reaching 70 percent by the end of 2014. After that, the deficit is projected 
to rise again, even though it is assumed that the economic recovery continues. The 
increase accelerates after 2018, as interest costs become a major part of the budget 
problem. They are expected to rise 4-1/2 times between 2010 and 2020 as the debt 
grows and interest rates are projected to rise modestly. The debt could be as large 
as 90 percent of GDP by 2020 unless the newly elected Congress cuts back 
President Obama’s spending plans significantly. 
Is There Any Hope? 
Some believe that the numbers just cited are far too pessimistic. They argue that 
the nation faced severe budget problems before and that we have done something 
about it. In 1990, when the deficit was rising at an alarming rate and blasting 
through the targets set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, the elder President 
Bush got together with a Democratic Congress and they fashioned a major, bi-
partisan budget deal that very significantly reduced the deficit from where it would 
have been otherwise. Unfortunately, the deficit continued to rise rapidly because of 
the lingering effects of the 1990 recession and that induced President Clinton to 
negotiate another deal with Congress, almost as large as Bush’s. Republican’s 
refused to go along and the deal enacted in 1993 was supported only by 
Democrats.  
Exogenous events also contributed to deficit reduction. The Cold War ended 
and defense spending was cut substantially. The tech boom on Wall Street helped 
bring in a flood of revenues, mostly from the very, very rich, and a budget surplus 
emerged in 1998 that caught everyone by surprise. It was the first surplus since 
1969. The optimists argue that there is no good reason that we cannot combine 
good policy and a bit of good luck yet again and cure our fiscal woes. 
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This Time It’s Different2 
I find it hard to believe that we can easily repeat the experiences of the 1990s. The 
world is now very different and the problems are much more challenging. First, we 
start off in much worse shape. In 1990, the debt in the hands of the public was 42 
percent of GDP. By the end of 2012, the next fiscal year, it is expected to be over 
70 percent of GDP. By 2020, with Obama budget policies, it is expected to 
approach 90 percent. The rapid growth in the debt implies that the policy changes 
necessary to achieve fiscal stability are now much more painful than they were in 
the early 1990s.  
Second, the importance of Social Security and health programs has risen 
dramatically since the 1990s. In 1990, spending in the two areas was 6.9 percent of 
GDP. By 2008, it had grown to 8.8 percent of GDP. It is projected to be 11.9 
percent of GDP in 2019. In other words, it is expected to grow about 70 percent in 
relative importance over 29 years. Social Security is probably the most politically 
popular program ever invented. It will not be reformed easily. Medicare is almost 
as popular politically. It accounts for the bulk of health spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
2
 Apologies to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), authors of This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 
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Figure 4.  
 
 
Third, Congress has recently been essentially dysfunctional when it comes to 
making fiscal policy. It was not able to pass a budget resolution for fiscal year 
2011. It is the first time since the congressional budget process started in 1975 that 
the House has not been able to pass a budget. Also, Congress allowed the estate tax 
to expire in 2010, as if by accident, and was not able to decide the fate of the Bush 
tax cuts until they were on the verge of expiring. That created much uncertainty 
about tax policy in 2011, when additional uncertainty was the last thing needed 
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during an anemic economic recovery. Even worse, important tax issues for 2010 
were left unsettled until the year was almost over. No one knew for certain how 
much alternative minimum tax they would be paying, and it was unclear whether 
many temporary tax provisions, such as the research and experimentation tax 
credit, would be renewed.  
As has become quite common, the appropriation process that funds the 
discretionary spending of the government was not completed by the beginning of 
the fiscal year. Indeed, none of the 12 necessary appropriation bills were passed in 
a timely manner and that is quite uncommon. Other important spending issues 
were left hanging. It was not clear whether the extension of unemployment 
insurance would be renewed or amended, and the law that required a cut in 
Medicare reimbursements for doctors of more than 20 percent was suspended in 
December, but only through January 1, 2011. All the tax and some of the spending 
issues were finally resolved in the middle of December as the result of a mega deal 
between Republican leaders and the president, but it should have been done 
months earlier.  
Congress has not had a sorrier record in the 40 years that I have been 
watching the formulation of fiscal policy. It is not surprising that public approval 
of Congress is in the basement and that the electorate chose to ―throw the bums 
out‖—at least some of them—in the 2010 election. The solid Republican majority 
that resulted does not mean that the electorate loves Republicans. It mainly showed 
that they disliked many incumbents. 
Almost a quarter of House members will be freshmen as the 112
th
 Congress 
convenes in January 2011. That, of course, implies that three-quarters of the old 
guard will remain. Will the new members have enough clout to reform Congress 
and induce it to act more rationally? There is no doubt that the new Congress will 
be considerably more fiscally conservative than the old one. That is not only 
because so many new fiscal conservatives were elected. The public mood forced 
many older members, including some Democrats, to become much more 
conservative during the campaign than they would have been otherwise. 
11 
 
But fiscal conservatism will run head-on into budget arithmetic and political 
reality. It is safe to say that many new members—and quite a few old ones—do not 
understand that they will face budgets in which about 50 percent of total spending 
consists of Social Security and health benefits, with Medicare dominating the 
latter. Few chose to question these programs during the campaign and some who 
did, lost (e.g., Sharron Angel of Nevada). Also, it was not reassuring earlier in 
2010 to see Republicans almost uniformly oppose every last dollar of Medicare 
cuts used to help finance health reform.  
It does seem clear that we shall see extreme stringency toward both defense 
and civilian discretionary spending in the next Congress. Although that will help a 
little, discretionary cuts cannot stabilize the long-run fiscal situation by themselves. 
True fiscal consolidation will require Social Security and health reform and some 
revenue increases. 
There is one faint ray of hope. Early in 2010, the president appointed a 
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, chaired by former 
Senator Alan Simpson and former White House chief of staff under President 
Clinton, Erskine Bowles. Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress each 
appointed three incumbent Senators and three House members. The president 
appointed six public members drawn from both political parties. The rules of the 
commission required that for the report to be put before Congress, 14 of the 18 
members had to approve any recommendations. The probability of that happening 
was virtually zero, especially since congressional Republicans and Democrats 
appointed some members from the ideological extremes of their parties. 
The members of the commission and their staffs knew that they faced 
daunting odds, but they worked very hard at their task. Discussions were congenial 
despite the ideological chasm among the members. It was an island of sanity in an 
otherwise crazy Washington. In the end, they produced a balanced report that had 
the potential to completely solve the long-run budget problem. Through 2020, 
roughly 70 percent of the solution came from slowing spending growth and 30 
percent from revenue increases, not counting associated interest savings.
3
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 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth, (Washington, DC, 2010).  
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Remarkably, 11 of the 18 members supported the recommendations. More 
remarkably, support covered the ideological spectrum from Senator Coburn, who 
may be the most conservative member of the Senate, to Senator Durbin, a solid 
liberal. Support also came from Senators Crapo and Gregg. I believe that it is the 
first time elected Republicans have explicitly endorsed revenue increases. 
The work of the president’s commission was complemented by a report from 
a private, bipartisan task force headed by former Senator Pete Domenici and 
former OMB and CBO director, Alice Rivlin. There was much overlap between 
their recommendations and those of the president’s commission. Both advocated 
radical tax reform; both slowed the growth of Social Security benefits in a 
progressive manner; and both were hard on discretionary spending. The bipartisan 
task force solved a considerably higher portion of the budget problem with tax 
increases and advocated a 6.5 percent value added tax to do so. 
The existence of the two important committees inspired many other groups, 
from the far right to the far left, to bring forth their own budget plans. Some 
members of the president’s commission who dissented from the main report also 
felt the need to have their own plans. 
Unfortunately, all this activity received only tepid support from our political 
leaders. Speaker Boehner thanked the president’s commission for drawing 
attention to the budget problem and has referred to the need for Social Security 
reform without specifically mentioning any changes in the law. Former Speaker 
Pelosi called an earlier version of the commission’s report ―unacceptable.‖ The 
president’s budget for fiscal year 2012 has not yet been released as this is written, 
but it will be a huge surprise if it advocates specific policies aimed at solving the 
long-run problem. He will advocate significant restraints on discretionary 
spending, but as previously noted, that will only help a little in attacking our fiscal 
woes. 
The president seems to be adopting a policy that is politically cautious and 
economically reckless. Although the public is concerned about the deficit, it is not 
at the top of their concerns. Moreover, there is strong public opposition to almost 
all possible major deficit reducing measures, whether they involve higher taxes or 
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Social Security and Medicare reform. Consequently, the president is concerned 
that if he advocates unpopular deficit reducing measures, the Republicans will 
demagogue him to death. At the same time, Republicans fear that if they take the 
initiative, they will be demagogued to death. It would seem a good time for the two 
parties to negotiate a solution that would allow them to jump off the cliff together, 
but that does not seem imminent. 
The president and his economic advisors may be right in deciding that a 
fiscal crisis is highly unlikely before the next election. In fiscal year 2012, the 
Federal Reserve will be buying 40 to 50 percent of the debt issued to finance the 
deficit, and the amount left over will not be far above 5 percent of the GDP. One 
worries about what will happen when the Fed has to sell a significant portion of its 
Treasury holdings to sop up excess reserves while the Treasury still has to finance 
large deficits, but that day may be far away. 
In summary, there is much more interest in our budget problems than ever 
before, and there will probably be even more interest in the future. Initially, the 
only action will involve curbs on discretionary spending. It appears as though 
policymakers and the public will only slowly accept the notion that budget reform 
requires Social Security and health policy reform along with tax increases affecting 
more than the ―rich.‖  
There is something of a race going on. Will budget reform occur before the 
United States faces a sovereign debt crisis? Or is a crisis the only thing that will 
provoke reform? 
The debate over raising the debt limit will either just be over or in full swing 
as this article is published. The debate will create major risks as the contending 
parties play chicken over the possibility that the United States will default on the 
interest owed on its debt. However, the debate can also create an opportunity for 
negotiating meaningful budget reforms. At the moment, there appears to be little 
appetite for the latter, but we can hope. In 1985, a debt limit debate led to the 
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law of 1985, which set deficit targets and enforced them 
with sequesters.
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If Fiscal Policy Is So Bad, Why Are Interest Rates So Low? 
It is gratifying, if somewhat puzzling, to see that foreign and domestic investors 
have sufficient confidence in future U.S. fiscal policies to have driven interest rates 
on U.S. Treasuries to extraordinarily low levels in 2010. But we should not be 
reassured. The history of sovereign debt crises teaches that it is not at all 
uncommon for financial markets to remain calm while the fiscal situation 
deteriorates. Then suddenly, bond prices collapse and interest rates can go up 300 
to 400 basis points in a matter of days.  
There is no way of predicting when such a crisis will occur. It happens at 
wildly different debt-to-GDP ratios. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) point out that 
more than half the countries experiencing debt crises had debt-to-GDP ratios less 
than 60 percent—a level that we now exceed. Niall Ferguson (2010) has noted 
―that news—bad news—on a quiet news day can cause market sentiment to 
change.‖ 
Having just said that crises are impossible to forecast, it is hard to resist 
speculating on what might set one off in the United States. Might it be a 
downgrade of Treasury debt by S&P or Moody’s? Or might a worsening of the 
sovereign debt crises in Europe draw more attention to the fact that, by many 
measures, our debt situation is just as bad? Or maybe the United States will be 
worse off if Europe solves its debt crisis. We could be left as the only major, truly 
irresponsible country left in the world, and there would be plenty of other places 
for investors to take their money safely. 
It has already been noted that the debate over the debt limit will create 
significant risks. Inherently, it is a totally irrational debate. Congress will be 
                                           
4
 I would not argue that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) was particularly successful in that its deficit targets were 
soon made more lenient and then the process collapsed when it proved impossible to meet the more lenient targets. 
However, the collapse of GRH inspired the 1990 budget deal that massively reduced the deficit, and the deal was 
enforced by the Budget Enforcement Act that provided considerable budget discipline until a budget surplus 
emerged by total surprise in 1998. 
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debating whether to finance tax and spending decisions that are already on the 
books. A domestic or foreign investor in U.S. debt witnessing this spectacle might 
decide that it is time to dump Treasuries. But luckily, Congress has always been 
brow beaten into passing an increase in the limit just before the nation plunges 
over a cliff.
5
 Hopefully, investors will assume that history will repeat itself and that 
all will be well. But it is the sort of thing that could be a catalyst for financial 
instability. It is a debate that we could easily do without. 
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 There have been times that delays in passing a new limit have forced the Treasury to resort to creative financing, 
such as delaying the deposit of bonds purchased by civil servants for their pension accounts.. 
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Reaction to a Crisis 
How might the United States react if interest rates suddenly soared three or four 
hundred basis points, the stock market crashed, and the dollar plummeted? 
Inflation—Many governments have tried to inflate their way out of fiscal 
difficulties. It works, albeit with great pain. The real value of the national debt is 
reduced, but more important, the budget is reformed. A hyperinflation reduces the 
real pay of civil servants to almost nothing. It does the same to appropriations for 
discretionary programs and to the value of many social benefits. Even where 
benefits are indexed, lags in the indexing process make COLA adjustments 
ineffective. At the same time, seigniorage and the implied tax on assets 
denominated in money terms provide resources that the government can use. 
 The problem is that it is hard to run a hyperinflation for much more than a 
year. After that people stop using money. But at that point, the compensation 
systems for civil servants and social programs have essentially been destroyed. 
They can then be reformed from scratch. 
 Needless to say, it is a terrible way to cure a fiscal crisis. Many countries 
that emerged as the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union used it, 
including Russia. Emerging economies and even sophisticated countries, such as 
Israel, have used it. But I take some comfort from the fact that serious inflation has 
been avoided by democracies similar to the United States when they confronted 
fiscal crises. For example, Canada, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand escaped 
fiscal crises with rational cuts in spending and tax increases and did not succumb 
to high inflation. 
 It may be tempting to run a more modest inflation to erode the real value of 
the debt slowly. However, that would not work well in the United States because 
the average maturity of our debt is short. Roughly 30 percent of our debt must be 
refinanced every year. That implies that an increase in inflation would increase 
debt servicing costs very quickly and would not help much in resolving our fiscal 
problems. 
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 In addition, it would be necessary to destroy the independence of the Federal 
Reserve System to engineer a significant inflation. Although the Fed is less 
politically popular than it has ever been in my memory, it is primarily because 
many critics worry that it risks too much inflation with quantitative easing and its 
various bailouts. Its most vociferous critic, Rep. Ron Paul, wants to substitute a 
gold standard. Whatever its other characteristics, a gold standard would not be 
conducive to inflation. 
Social Security and health reform—As noted above, spending in these two 
areas is the main reason that our budget is out of control. I noted that it is 
extremely difficult to reform these programs, but could we do it if forced by a 
crisis? Under such conditions, reform is possible, but it is difficult to reduce 
spending growth quickly. Most of the benefits go to retired people and very abrupt 
changes in the programs would wreak havoc with retirement planning. Therefore, 
most reform proposals phase in changes slowly. For example, the Social Security 
reforms recommended by the president’s fiscal commission will be phased in over 
the next 50 years. Health spending growth is not significantly slowed until 2020, 
and no definite plan is put forth to achieve the slowing—only a number of options.  
In a crisis, potential buyers of our debt are likely to demand that we save 
more money in the short run than is possible with entitlement reform. They may 
not be confident that we have the discipline to go through with benefit reductions 
and tax increases scheduled for the long run. Shorter-run deficit reductions will be 
necessary. Nevertheless, Social Security and health reform has to be part of any 
fiscal consolidation. Politicians can use a crisis as an excuse for doing things that 
would be too painful otherwise. Canada and Sweden enacted far reaching Social 
Security reforms that did little to reduce deficits in the short run, but that greatly 
improved their long-run fiscal health. 
Discretionary spending—Because it is so difficult to reduce the growth of 
Social Security and health spending quickly, cuts in discretionary spending will 
have to be part of any fiscal reform, especially one that occurs in response to a 
crisis. That way, the deficit can be lowered quickly without large tax increases. 
Cuts in discretionary spending for defense will be necessary to persuade liberals to 
go along with cuts in nondefense spending. 
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 While cuts in discretionary spending would be essential if the country faces 
a crisis, they are likely to occur even without a crisis. President Obama will 
propose a five-year freeze on nonsecurity spending in his 2012 budget. He has 
already suggested a two-year freeze in civil service pay. The newly elected 
Republican majority in the House vows to return discretionary spending to 2008 
levels. New members affiliated with the Tea Party would like to cut even more. 
 Although the long-run budget problem cannot be solved solely with cuts in 
discretionary spending, every little bit helps. Such cuts can delay the time at which 
we pass through certain thresholds, such as exceeding a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 
percent. 
Revenue increases—Whether fiscal consolidation comes as a result of a 
crisis or a more deliberative process, it is hard to imagine a resolution of our 
budget problems without some increase in revenues, especially if the goal is to 
balance the budget so that the debt-to-GDP ratio declines in the long run. The cuts 
in spending necessary to avoid any revenue increase are too draconian to be 
politically plausible.
6
 A few conservatives may accept such cuts, but there is little 
chance that they would be approved by a majority of Congress. 
 However, Republicans have been adamantly opposed to any increase in the 
tax burden, and that is a major reason for being pessimistic about solving our 
budget problems without a crisis. Recently, there have been a few cracks in the 
Republican wall of opposition, but the cracks are still pretty thin. It was earlier 
noted that three Republican Senators—Coburn, Crapo, and Gregg—who served on 
the president’s commission backed the commission recommendations, which 
included a revenue-raising tax reform and a 15 cent per gallon increase in the gas 
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 For an example of a policy package that solves the budget problem while avoiding any tax increase, see National 
Research Council and National Academy of Public Administration (2010), Chapter 4. I have testified (Penner 2009, 
2010, see below) that the spending path specified in this package is implausible politically. The spending path is 
particularly harsh, because the committee set a goal of stabilizing the debt at 60 percent of GDP by 2022. That 
required large spending cuts quickly. The president’s commission was not that ambitious and still has a debt-to-GDP 
ratio higher than 60 percent well into the 2020s. 
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tax. It is significant that Gregg has retired and Coburn will not be running for re-
election.  
More generally, many conservatives are recognizing that many of the 
deductions, tax credits, and exclusions in our tax code are simply expenditure 
programs in disguise. They do not like spending programs and may be willing to 
contemplate revenue-raising eliminations of tax expenditures. But the base 
broadening would have to be sufficient to allow more revenues to be raised with 
lower marginal tax rates. That is likely to involve attacking and limiting some 
sacred cows, such as the mortgage interest deduction, and many political 
moderates may not be too thrilled about that. 
 Radical tax reform is a complex and contentious endeavor, especially if it 
involves raising more revenue than the current system provides. It is hard to 
imagine getting a radical reform done fast enough to quell a budget crisis. It is also 
hard to imagine raising significant revenues by simply raising tax rates in the 
current system. It is too inequitable and inefficient. That leaves the possibility of a 
new tax, such as a carbon tax or a value added tax (VAT). It could be argued that a 
new tax would also be hard to design in a timely fashion, but that may not be true 
of a VAT. There is plenty of European experience and there are groups in 
Washington working on the technical details involved in creating a VAT for the 
United States.
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Conclusions 
It is difficult to be optimistic that our budget problems can be fixed without a 
crisis. The policy changes necessary to avoid a debt explosion are large and 
painful. They are, in fact, more painful than they would have been earlier because 
Social Security and health costs have become overwhelmingly important on the 
spending side of the budget, and they are growing rapidly. Moreover, Social 
Security and Medicare, the dominant program in health care, may be the two most 
politically popular programs provided by the U.S. government. 
                                           
7
 See ―Symposium on Designing a Federal VAT,‖ Parts I and II, Tax Law Review 63, no. 2 and no. 3 (Spring 2010 
and Winter 2010): 285–516 and 517–770.  
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 Solving the problem will take strong leadership and bipartisan cooperation. 
The two parties will have to join hands and jump off the cliff together. At this 
moment, it does not look like they will join hands until the nation is already over 
the edge. 
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